



June 22, 2026

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
8901 La Jolla Shores Drive
La Jolla, California
92037-1509 USA

Dear Chair Mr. Antonio Vasquez and Director Arnulfo Franco,

Canada wishes to thank the Chair for all his work in pulling together the thorough compendium of comments regarding the intersessional work on the categorization of non-compliance status. We appreciated the consolidation of the information in an effective manner for review, as well as the clear identification of areas of convergence/divergence for further consideration.

We also wish to thank all the Members who shared their thoughtful feedback. We carefully considered all the input, and offer up some comments for consideration.

Theme 1- Defining Objective Criteria for PNC Severity Levels

Canada remains supportive of a 4-tier potential non-compliance approach and is generally supportive of the version proposed by the European Union, while utilizing a compliant category and one additional category, as proposed by Vanuatu, for “not able to be assessed” (specifically for situations when an obligation is found to be ambiguous and should be reviewed by COR, or, situations related to the safety of a ship/crew or saving life at sea). Given the views expressed by others, and for simplicity in the process, we are also amenable to a 3-tier potential non-compliance approach as well, as proposed by Vanuatu, and remain open to engaging further on this matter.

We have no strong views on the naming structure, as long as the levels are logical and clear. While we are generally supportive of the EU’s proposal, we would recommend discussing potential revisions to their proposed category names for additional clarity. In particular, there seems to be a large difference between the categories of “minor non-compliant” and “seriously non-compliant”, whereas the difference between “seriously non-compliant,” “very seriously non-compliant,” and “critically non-compliant” are not sufficiently clear. We do not think that the terminology of “years” should be added to the levels because, though we agree that the non-compliance level should generally increase each year the issue remains unresolved, different cases of non-compliance will likely have

different starting levels.

We remain supportive of the principle of pre-assigned starting levels by PNC type, and the PNC types listed in COR14 as those that should be assigned to the most serious level. We are not opposed to the USA's proposal to categorize "exceeding active FAD limits by a significant number, or to remain over its active FAD limit for more than 10 consecutive days" at the most serious level, however, we would request clarification be added about the definition for "exceeding by a significant number".

Where a reporting deadline has not been met, but the required report is submitted prior to the circulation of the Draft Compliance Report, and it is not a repeated case of non-compliance, we are supportive of the proposal by Vanuatu whereby a status of the least serious level of potential non-compliance and "no further action" is assigned in the Draft Compliance Report to help focus COR review on more substantive cases of potential non-compliance requiring attention/discussion.

We also wish to re-iterate our agreement with including a clause stating that should an instance of non-compliance be identified that does not fall within the descriptions established in the document, the COR will make a recommendation on the appropriate level for that type of potential non-compliance, in line with the criteria and approach established therein.

Theme 2: Clarifying Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

Canada is supportive of the European Union's proposal to retain frequency as the only automatic aggravating factor, and that failure to respect a given obligation in successive years would automatically increase the PNC level by one level. CPCs could then provide any mitigating factors during the COR for consideration in determining if the automatic increase in level should be retained or not.

Canada is not supportive of including the mitigating factors proposed by China. We see reporting voluntarily before notification from the Secretariat and implementation of corrective/remedial measures by the CPC to prevent recurrence as actions which should already be occurring as part of normal processes.

Theme 3: Clarifying the Subject of Assessment and Responsibility

Canada is supportive of the European Union's recommended text, outlined in their Annex 2, setting out a statement of purpose for the compliance review process.

Theme 4: Alignment with the IATTC Legal Framework — Warranted Actions

Canada is generally supportive of the European Union's proposed warranted actions for cases of very serious non-compliance but would seek guidance from the Secretariat on what information could/should be included in the Action Plans. We take note of Vanuatu's proposal on the follow up actions as well, and remain open to further discussing how the two proposals could be integrated in order to strike a better balance with specificity while

not being overly burdensome. We agree with the USA's comment about keeping our options for warranted actions broad enough so that the COR can assess each potential instance of non-compliance on a case-by-case basis, envisioning an iterative process in which a framework is adopted, and specific criteria may be refined over time.

Theme 5: Table Structure and Practical Application

Canada welcomes the European Union's proposal and suggested text which would integrate C-22-02 status categories into a single framework alongside severity levels, as well as the revisions to the Standard Compliance questionnaire.

Further to China's comment on having one-time legislative or structural requirements requiring only a single review which, upon fulfillment, would be sufficient, we have some reservations at this time. We acknowledge the desire to streamline the review process where possible, but note that the full implementation of many CPC obligations may require more than a one-time legislative change and regular review. We remain open to discussing to seek greater clarity on their recommendation.

Additional Matters Arising from the First Round

On the topic of developing explicit criteria and procedures for the resolution of a non-compliance status, we support the notion that it is up to CPCs to demonstrate to the COR what measures they have taken to rectify the situation and ensure compliance moving forward, and for the COR and Commission to decide if that is satisfactory, on a case-by-case basis.

Canada remains mindful that this compliance improvement process was initiated during the special biennial meeting in 2024, and deemed by the COR and Commission to be a short-term priority, for action within the next 2 years. We feel that this is sufficient time to complete the request. We do not feel that any recommendations derived from the harmonization exercise (to be presented in 2027) would significantly impact any of the components of this improvement process. We appreciate the Chair's proposed path for resolving legal interpretation questions at COR17, and look forward to gaining clarity on these matters at that time.

Further to the comments in the letter from the Central American countries regarding the use of sanctions, we wish to re-iterate our position that we view the Compliance review process as a shared commitment to accountability, transparency and improvement in meeting the objectives and obligations of the Commission. It is not intended to be accusatory, punitive or adversarial. Rather, it provides an opportunity for CPCs to reflect on and discuss challenges, share best practices, and take responsibility, with the goal of continuous improvement. Canada's suggestions and proposals throughout this process remain in line with this position; we hope that this framing helps resolve some of the reservations held by Members regarding the process and/or the general vision for this revised potential non-compliance categorization work.

Canada appreciates the opportunity to contribute to this process and looks forward to engaging in constructive, collaborative discussions with all participants to make meaningful progress in advance of the annual meeting later this year.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. Lindstedt", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Amber Lindstedt
Canadian Head of Delegation to the IATTC



**GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND EXTERNAL TRADE
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR OFFSHORE FISHERIES AFFAIRS**

June 10, 2026

Mr. Antonio Vázquez, COR Chairperson

Mr. Arnulfo Franco, IATTC Director

Vanuatu wishes to express some views regarding the Categorization of non-compliance status and follow-up actions and takes the opportunity to thank the Chairperson of the COR and the Secretariat for the hard work they have done in the intersessional period to advance in this important matter, as well as to express our appreciation for the comments and proposals submitted by different CPCs.

Vanuatu noted the three-step approach recommended for the COR to that end comprised in its document COR-16 INF-A:

- a. First, to define different levels of non-compliance in view of its seriousness (e.g., level 1, level 2, level 3).
- b. Secondly, each category of non-compliance status should be precisely defined with more clear criteria to guide CPCs, COR and the Commission on the decision regarding the applicable status.
- c. Finally, the COR should improve the identification of the specific follow-up action applicable to each status and level of seriousness, which would apply automatically. This will include the notification letters and the setting of corrective actions.

In that sense, and following the mentioned approach, Vanuatu would like to make some comments and proposals:

1. To define level of non-compliance in view of its seriousness. According to the document COR-16 INF-A, four categories of non-compliance status have been proposed: minor non-compliance; notable non-compliance; serious non-compliance; very serious non-compliance.

Vanuatu recognizes the value of having a multiple-levels structure. Regarding the non-compliance status we suggests to consolidate into three possible categories which we define below. However, Vanuatu is open to consider the proposed four-tier categorization.

The need to identify different categories of non-compliance status is clear, but it has to be understood in a wider framework of the CPC's overall performance assessment, which includes the status of compliance.

From our experience in other RFMOs, it could be convenient to include an additional status to cover situations where the assessment of compliance is not possible due to an obligation that is proven to be ambiguous or when there is a lack of clarity on the requirement of an obligation. Some definitions of this status also include cases where emergencies arise relating to the safety of a ship and crew or saving life at sea¹.

Therefore, Vanuatu proposes to have a five-status categorization to assess the performance of each CPC:

- a) Compliant (C);
- b) Minor non-compliant (MI);
- c) Notable non-compliant (NO);
- d) Serious or persistent non-compliant (SR)
- e) Not assessed (NA).

2. Precise definition, clear criteria. Independent of the number of statuses proposed, in Vanuatu's opinion, it is also important to rely on clear definitions or criteria to determine each status, which will make the objective of the review process more straightforward to then determine the follow-up actions to be proposed to the Commission for adoption. This categorization will allow all obligations established in the Convention and the conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission to be assessed in light of the CPC's performance contrasted with the previously determined status and be subject in case of non-compliance to a follow up action. Then, the objective would put a clear focus on assessing a CPC's performance in relation to a particular obligation.

Vanuatu, recognizing the value of the document COR-16 INF-A, in which this process has been based as a starting point, believes it needs to be complemented to meet the second purpose recommended by the COR, which is to clearly define or give criteria to understand what is the meaning of the different statuses. The text lacks a clear proposal in that regard.

Similar definitions of what is being sought with this work have been adopted by different organizations, where procedures for the evaluation of its Members and Cooperating Non Contracting Members performance have been adopted and based on some of these², Vanuatu proposes the following alternatives to the mentioned categories:

Compliant (C): CPC fully compliant with the obligation/Alt.: No compliance issue identified with respect to the relevant obligation.

¹ For reference, SPRFMO CMM 10-2020 and WCPFC 2023-04.

² For reference, CCAMLR CMM 10-10 (2019), SPRFMO CMM 10-2020 and WCPFC 2023-04.

Minor non-compliant (MI): Actions or omissions which constitute a minor infringement of relevant obligations or those cases where insufficient, unclear or incorrect data or information has been provided.

Notable non-compliant (NO): Actions or omissions which constitute a serious infringement of relevant obligations; lack of compliance that undermines the effectiveness of the Convention or CMMs and failure to comply with previous CPC performance assessment/review recommendations adopted by the Commission, after sufficient time and assistance has been provided.

Serious or persistent non-compliant (SR): action or omissions that constitute a very serious infringement or repeated serious (notable non-compliance) infringement of relevant obligations; repeated non-compliance that undermines the effectiveness of the Convention or CMMs, and repeated failure to comply with previous plan of actions after sufficient time and assistance has been provided.

Not assessed (NA): performance of CPC not possible to assess due to an obligation that is proven to be ambiguous/Alt.:there is a lack of clarity on the requirements of an obligation. Also, in situations where cases of emergency have arisen relating to the safety of a ship and crew or saving life at sea.

3. Follow-up actions applicable to each status.

To implement an effective review of compliance, the follow-up actions which would result from the status assigned need to be previously determined.

Vanuatu proposes to modify the nomenclature of “warranted” actions to “follow up” actions for easier understanding of the concept.

In case of a Compliant status no further action is required.

In case of Minor non-compliance status, Vanuatu proposes, undertaking a review of compliance to identify non-compliance of a minor or technical nature or obligations with respect to which further information is required in order to identify implementation gaps and improve compliance and the submission of missing or corrected data or information.

In cases where a reporting timeframe or deadline had not been met, but the information was provided by the relevant CPC before the assessment by the COR a status of MI applies and requires no further action.

In case of Notable non-compliance status, the action proposed is to develop a detailed plan of action to assist the relevant CPC to actively take steps to respond to and rectify non-compliance

or improve implementation of relevant obligations, including through the provision of technical assistance or capacity building, where appropriate.

In case of Serious or Persistent non-compliance status, the action to be taken is to identify a Compliance Remedy to address instances of persistent non-compliance which have not been resolved even after sufficient time and assistance have been provided through a plan of action.

In case of Not assessed status, the Commission is to clarify the obligation and if necessary review and amend relevant provision or CMM and no further action in cases of emergency described in the definition.

Regarding Theme 1, Vanuatu supports the principle of pre-assigned level by PNC type, where specific types of PNC should carry an assigned higher starting level. In this regard and among others, for cases such as exceeding catch limits required by IATTC, failure to implement and/or enforce time/area closures and failure to respect capacity limits.

Additionally, in order to streamline the process and considering the time constraints we face during the annual meetings, in those cases where reporting timeframe or deadlines have not been met, but the required obligation has been met prior to the circulation of the Draft Compliance Report, and it is not a repeated case of non-compliance, Vanuatu proposes that the COR Chairperson with the assistance of the Director propose a status of “Minor non-compliance” and “no further action” in the Draft Compliance Report.³

Regarding Theme 2, Vanuatu does not have a strong opinion on the application of mitigating and aggravating factors, but does recognize that it could be burdensome. Vanuatu agrees that failure to resolve a PNC by the next years meeting should be considered as an escalation factor.

Summary table

Compliance status	Criteria	Follow up
Compliant	CPC fully compliant with the obligation. Alt.: No compliance issue identified with respect to the relevant obligation.	No further action
Minor non-compliance	Actions or omissions which constitute a minor infringement of relevant obligations or those cases where insufficient, unclear or incorrect data or information has been provided.	Undertake a review of compliance to identify non-compliance of a minor or technical nature or obligations with respect to which further information is required in order to identify implementation gaps and improve compliance. Submission of missing or corrected data or information.

³ For reference, SPRFMO CMM 10-2020 paragraph 11.

Notable non-compliance	Actions or omissions which constitute a serious infringement of relevant obligations; lack of compliance that undermines the effectiveness of the Convention or CMM and failure to comply with previous CPC performance assessment/review recommendations adopted by the Commission, after sufficient time and assistance has been provided.	Develop a detailed plan of action to assist the relevant CPC to actively take steps to respond to and rectify non-compliance or improve implementation of relevant obligations, including through the provision of technical assistance or capacity building, where appropriate.
Serious or Persistent non-compliance	Action or omissions that constitute a very serious infringement or repeated serious (notable non-compliance) infringement of relevant obligations; repeated non-compliance that undermines the effectiveness of the Antigua Convention or CMMs, and repeated failure to comply with previous plan of actions after sufficient time and assistance has been provided.	Identify a Compliance Remedy to address instances of persistent non-compliance which have not been resolved even after sufficient time and assistance have been provided through a plan of action.
Not assessed	Performance of CPC not possible to assess due to an obligation that is proven to be ambiguous. Alt.: There is a lack of clarity on the requirements of an obligation. Cases of emergency have arisen relating to the safety of a ship and crew or saving life at sea.	Commission is to clarify the obligation and if necessary review and amend relevant provision or CMM. No further action in cases of emergency.

Additional points

To implement the above and in order to improve what it is to date the path to assess the CPC's performance requires the amendment of Resolution C-22-02. In Vanuatu's opinion the categorization and follow up actions need to be included in that resolution by replacing the current table in Annex 2.

In response to theme 3, Vanuatu agrees with the opinion that the compliance has to be assessed at the CPC level and further agrees with EU's proposal to include a new paragraph in the relevant Resolution describing the purpose of the review process, which will allow for a greater understanding of the scope of such process.

Vanuatu believes that the optimization of the process and its effectiveness is highly important, avoiding excessive procedures which create additional burden for the Secretariat.

The compliance assessment process could be carried out on an annual basis, formal communication of possible compliance issues would be announced with the annual submission of the Draft Compliance Report for each CPC sent by the Director.

Based on discussions and outcomes of the COR meeting, the Provisional Compliance Report would be forwarded to the Commission for adoption or further discussion. With the adoption of the Final Compliance Report, implementation of the follow up actions begin immediately.

To complete the process, it would be necessary that the COR assess every year the follow up actions from the previous year, therefore the COR meeting agenda should contain a standing item on follow-up actions. During that agenda item each CPC would provide a report of the actions taken in accordance with the Final Compliance Report from the previous year.

Finally, Vanuatu agrees as well with other CPCs that for all possible non-compliance status, the COR should consider capacity building and technical assistance options.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink is written over a circular official stamp. The stamp contains the text "REPUBLIC OF VANUATU" at the top, "COMMISSIONER FOR OFFSHORE FISHERIES AFFAIRS" in the center, and "REPUBLIQUE DE VANUATU" at the bottom.

Saade MAKHLOUT

Commissioner for Offshore Fisheries Affairs

Intersessional Work on Categorisation of Non-compliance and Follow-up Actions

Contribution from the European Union

Second round of written comments (Phase 3)

This submission is in response to the first round of comments as circulated to CPCs on 17 April 2026 (ref. 0156-410).

Although the Chair encourages CPCs to refrain from engaging in written debates on the legal interpretation questions raised in the summary document, it is not possible to respond to Themes 6 and 7 without doing so. The EU therefore offers some preliminary remarks on these legal interpretation issues in the present submission, while reserving its position on all issues.

Theme 1: defining objective criteria for PNC severity levels

Working assumption

The EU generally supports the working assumptions outlined in section 1.5 as regards the four-tiered structure for PNC levels, the retention of the COR14 list and the need for a residual clause. The EU is open to discussing the nomenclature of the four-tiered structure, noting that it is more important to agree on the criteria, obligations, and follow-up actions that correspond to each PNC level.

However, capacity building and technical assistance are not directly relevant for the assignment of PNC levels. These should therefore be removed from consideration under Theme 1 and considered when determining follow-up actions.

Emerging convergence

The EU supports the principle that specific types of PNC should carry an assigned starting level higher than MI. As regards the methods for assigning criteria, we maintain that it is not necessary to provide separate abstract definitions for each PNC level. In this sense, the EU supports an imperfect yet simple ‘table embedded’ approach with pre-assigned starting levels based on a compliance status-based architecture. The EU notes that its proposed approach implicitly incorporates many of the elements outlined under approaches A and B.

Areas of divergence

As regards the possibility of defining quantitative thresholds for distinguishing SR from VS for overharvest (like what is proposed for missed deadlines under approach A), the EU is open to considering this option in the context of a more general reflection on how to address overharvest as well as instances where CPCs exceed fleet size, fishing effort or other capacity limits (e.g., FADs).

Theme 2: clarifying mitigating and aggravating factors

Working assumption

The EU generally supports the working assumptions outlined in section 2.5 as regards the retention of an adjustment mechanism. However, in the interest of simplicity, only frequency should be retained as an automatic aggravating factor. Moreover, to ensure a consistent approach, the adjustment should operate on an automatic basis rather than a case-by-case assessment. (Relative) simplicity should be the key criterion for the system's design if it is to be operational.

The EU does not support the use of other, non-frequency factors for PNC level assignment, which would significantly increase the complexity of the assessment but is open to considering them under follow-up actions. Moreover, voluntary self-reporting of non-compliance before notification from the Secretariat should not automatically be accepted as a mitigating measure particularly for PNC levels SR and VS, and consideration of 'implementation of corrective or remedial measures' at the stage of categorising PNCs appears to mix two distinct concepts which should be kept separate (1. categorisation of non-compliance depending on level of severity; and 2. definition of follow-up actions).

Emerging convergence

The EU agrees with the general principle that failure to resolve a PNC by the following year (or rather repeated non-compliance) should result in escalation to the next level. There is no need for this principle to operate within a broader mitigating/aggravating mechanism as this would be burdensome and complicated to implement. The suggestion to take into account active engagement with capacity building could be addressed by 'freezing' a PNC while such engagement is ongoing, thereby preventing it from escalating to the next level for the duration of the capacity building.

Areas of divergence

As noted under 'working assumption' and 'emerging convergence' above.

Theme 3: clarifying the subject of assessment and responsibility

Working assumption

The EU supports the working assumptions outlined in section 3.5 as regards the subject of compliance assessment and scope of obligations.

The EU invites CPCs to consider its proposed amendment to Resolution C-22-02.

Legal interpretation note

The EU reiterates its position that non-compliance with IATTC resolutions by operators or vessels that have been correctly detected by the responsible CPC and adequately followed up, do not need to be included in the compliance assessment procedure, but maintains that potential infringements by operators or vessels that are known or brought to the attention of the COR (e.g. through analysis of available information, complaints, intelligence), and that have not been detected by the responsible CPC should be included as they are indicative of a deficiency in the control system on the part of the CPC concerned. Similarly, a lack of appropriate follow-up action by the CPC as regards detected potential infringements should be within the scope of the assessment. Moreover, the mere initiation of proceedings against an operator is not enough in itself

to discharge a CPC's responsibilities regarding potential non-compliances. Such proceedings must be followed by appropriate and dissuasive sanctions in accordance with their national legislation.

Theme 4: alignment with IATTC legal framework

Working assumption

The EU supports the working assumption outlined in section 4.5 regarding a standardised format for Level 1 (MI) submissions and enhanced action plan requirements from Level 2 (NO). Standardised formats could also be elaborated for warranted actions under Levels 2 to 4, particularly for action plans.

As regards the working assumption on missing information deadline at Level 2 (NO), the EU generally agrees that CPCs should provide all missing information following the conclusion of that year's Commission meeting. However, a firm 3-month period may not be appropriate in all cases. The EU therefore proposes a more flexible approach that does not stipulate a fixed period (or that uses the 3-month period as a starting point for discussion) but leaves it to the determination of the COR/Commission.

The EU also supports the working assumption regarding the approach outlined for legally uncertain warranted actions, noting the need for further discussion at COR17.

Emerging convergence

The EU confirms its support for the approach.

Areas of divergence

As regards mandatory versus recommendation language in Level 3 (SR), the EU is open to considering the use of mandatory language, noting that ultimately consensus is needed for the COR/Commission to agree on warranted actions. On the other hand, the possibility of requiring a CPC to apply fishery restrictions and/or a reduction of fishing opportunities can only be applied if there is explicit legal grounding in a horizontal or in stock-specific resolutions.

Theme 5: table structure and practical application

Working assumption

As regards the questions in section 5.6, the EU supports structure B (compliance status-based table, Annex 2 to 0156-410) as the basis for the categorisation framework as it clearly summarises how different obligations are categorised without the need for a full listing of all resolutions/provisions. If an obligation-type organisation is considered useful, this could be integrated into structure B by adding a resolution/provision reference column into the table. Although the compliance categorisation framework and the Standard Compliance Questionnaire are two separate concepts and do not need to be explicitly linked, especially if categorisation of PNCs is automatic based on pre-agreed criteria, the addition of such a column in the structure B table would establish a clear link with the Standard Compliance Questionnaire.

The EU considers that Annex 2 of C-22-02 may need to be revised to integrate the outcomes of the intersessional work on the categorisation of non-compliance status. This could be addressed at COR17.

Theme 6: Additional matters arising from the first round

As regards section 6.1, the EU agrees on the need for clear reporting requirements. This could largely be addressed through the development of a template or standardised content for the action plans that CPCs would need to develop and implement to address instances of non-compliance.

On section 6.2, the EU considers that an explanatory memorandum can be useful to explain key elements under consideration in the work on compliance categorisation, while recalling that this work forms part of the COR's work plan. While there is no urgency as such to completing the categorisation framework, the work has been ongoing for several years already and should be continued at pace.

Theme 7: Joint submission by Central American CPCs – alternative system proposal

The EU welcomes the perspective presented in the joint submission and the efforts to develop an alternative system. While we agree that effective compliance should be ensured through the principle of cooperation, we do not support a system based on 'incentives' to promote compliance and we have doubts about the characterisation of 'sanctions' presented in the joint submission. Most RFMOs have similar mechanisms to what is under consideration at IATTC, and the effectiveness of the COR would be seriously undermined if it is not equipped with mechanisms to ensure that CPCs fulfil the commitments they have undertaken. A system based solely on the willingness and good faith of all CPCs is highly likely to fail.

On the issue of 'incentives' to further compliance, CPCs should not have to be incentivised to comply with their obligations under the Convention or Resolutions. They should comply with their obligations by virtue of their status as Contracting Parties. Article XVIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention requires Parties to take the measures necessary to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the Convention and any conservation and management measures adopted pursuant thereto, including the adoption of the necessary laws and regulations. A system of incentives is therefore neither necessary, nor appropriate.

As regards 'sanctions', the EU does not agree that the warranted actions under consideration in the compliance categorisation framework can be characterised as sanctions. Rather, they constitute the action required to bring a CPC into compliance. For example, a reduction of fishing opportunities in response a CPC overshooting a Commission agreed catch limit is not intended to penalise the responsible CPC, but to 'correct' an irregular situation, to address any potential excesses so as not to deviate from what is deemed necessary to maintain the stock in good condition, and to deter vessels from engaging in such activities. It should also be recalled that the Commission has already accepted that correction mechanisms can be used, as evidenced by the additional closure days system established under Resolution C-25-01, paragraph 4, for purse seiners that exceed the annual catch limit for bigeye tuna. By agreeing to establish such

mechanisms, CPCs give effect to their duty of cooperation under the Convention. Not establishing these mechanisms could jeopardise the correct management of the stocks concerned.

Finally, the EU considers that urgency of resolution is not the most appropriate criterion for categorising PNC. What is urgent is not always important and what is important is not always urgent. The focus of the compliance assessment should be on identifying and addressing those compliance issues that are most likely to undermine the Convention and the CMMs adopted by the Commission, which could include historical issues which remain unresolved. It is therefore necessary and pertinent to categorise PNCs according to their level of severity. This categorisation at IATTC level does not affect and remains independent of any specific categorisation CPCs may have established for infringements of IATTC obligations in their domestic laws.